El presente trabajo intenta esbozar algunos elementos característicos de la epistemología de la ciencia a través de la historia. Busca cuestionar la rigidez de la objetividad y reconocer los límites de la razón humana. Finalmente, se espera describir una propuesta de epistemología más flexible para su vinculación con la investigación educativa, con la intención de dotarla de especificidad.

Fernández’ most recent book constitutes an articulated development of several philosophical considerations on memory displayed in previous, and forthcoming publications. The result of such articulated development ends up being a consistent account that provides an innovative and thought-provoking perspective on episodic remembering. This volume not only gathers and articulates the author’s previous ideas, but also provides new reflections, and objections that encompasses four significant domains in the philosophy of memory. In the first part of the book, Fernández offers an account (...) of both the metaphysics and the intentionality of episodic memory; in the second part, the author deals with certain phenomenological aspects involved in remembering; in the third part, two important debates in the epistemology of memory are discussed. (shrink)

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure--represented by Strawson’s Jack/Jacques argument --hypothetical-- represented by Kriegel’s Zoe argument --and glossed-- first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal (...) contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper presents philosophical perspectives related to the concept of boredom from the point of view of its forms and structural modes as developed by Martin Heidegger in his lectures at the University of Freiburg during the winter semesters of 1929 and 1930. We highlight a philosophical stance often overlooked in comparison to more traditional positions in Western philosophical thought—through the proposed hermeneutic-phenomenological processes, this will allow us to interweave their philosophical images with cinematographic narratives that enrich the factual understanding (...) of modernity. For this reason, we assume boredom and its essence, “tediousness”, as the fundamental mood of our era, thus permitting other mobilities of thought that warrant a study of phenomena relating to cultural entertainment as a symptom of the modern disease that distances Dasein from meeting, questioning, and self-care. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The focus of this essay is Kant's argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go, I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism. However, I suggest that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism (...) if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events. RESUMEN El ensayo se enfoca en el argumento de Kant en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres III según el cual considerarse racional implica verse a uno mismo como libre. Se interpreta la forma en que debe entenderse el argumento y se afirma que Kant no logra demostrar que considerarse libre es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal. No obstante, se sugiere que el argumento sí logra demostrar que considerarse a uno mismo como racional es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal, si se acepta una cierta versión plausible de la explicación de los eventos. (shrink)

IntroductionThis study aimed to evaluate, in adults with mild cognitive impairment, the brain atrophy that may distinguish between three AT biomarker-based profiles, and to determine its clinical value.MethodsStructural MRI was employed to evaluate the volume and cortical thickness differences in MCI patients with different AT profiles, namely, A−T−−: normal AD biomarkers; A+T−−: AD pathologic change; and A+T++: prodromal AD. Sensitivity and specificity of these changes were also estimated.ResultsAn initial atrophy in medial temporal lobe areas was found in the A+T−− and (...) A+T++ groups, spreading toward the parietal and frontal regions in A+T++ patients. These structural changes allowed distinguishing AT profiles within the AD continuum; however, the profiles and their pattern of neurodegeneration were unsuccessful to determine the current clinical status.ConclusionsMRI is useful in the determination of the specific brain structural changes of AT profiles along the AD continuum, allowing differentiation between MCI adults with or without pathological AD biomarkers. (shrink)

En este trabajo se defiende que la filiación intelectual de Kierkegaard es moderna y tiene su raíz en la filosofía de Ockham. En cuanto a su encuadramiento, su existencialismo está a medio camino entre el nominalismo-idealismo y el realismo.

En este trabajo se estudia la virtud de la confianza como requisito de la sociabilidad. Tras revisar, en síntesis y según L. Polo, como se ha estimado esta virtud en la historia de la filosofía, y tras examinar algunas manifestaciones del vicio opuesto de la desconfianza, se indica cuál es su índole, su raíz y sus consecuencias, distinguiéndola al final de la fe intelectual o natural que tiene como tema solo a Dios.

Siguiendo la distinción tripartina en el hombre entre naturaleza corpórea, esencia y acto de ser personal, se trata de la virtud de la pureza o castidad y sus anejas, el pudor y la modestia, con referencia al cuerpo humano, a la voluntad y al corazón o intimidad humana siguiendo el pensamiento de L. Polo.

This text summarizes the 15 articles included in the book Futurizar el presente. Estudios sobre la filosofía de Leonardo Polo, edited by I. Falgueras, J. A. García and J. J. Padial. The writings are grouped in these chapters: Theory of language, History of Philosophy, Ratio and Will, Synderesis, Metaphysics and Anthropology. In this latest topic some very interesting and suggestive ideas are proposed.

After studying the historical background of the philosophical treatment or neglect of intelectual habits, this paper focuses on the research on the nature of habits and is divided into two essential parts: a) The research on the relationship that habits keep with the acts of knowing and the objects known by acts; b) The study of the existing relationship within habits themselves and the human being that is superior to them. All of this is based on the papers writen by (...) Prof. Polo. (shrink)

La sindéresis, también llamada por Tomás de Aquino razón natural, es cognoscititiva: un hábito innato por medio del cual la persona humana conoce y regula su naturaleza humana, y en especial, su razón y su voluntad, y está abierta a éstas facultades, tanto en su estado nativo como activadas. La sindéresis se conoce por medio de otro hábito innato, la sabiduría, y ambos dependen del intelecto agente.This paper presents Domingo Gundisalvo’s theory of knowledge and the end of our cognitive process (...) at the light “of the active Intelligence” . For human beings participate in this light wen at in effectu or in adeptus ab alio. The research takes into account Gundisalvo’s metaphysics background as exposed in his De processione mundi. (shrink)

Esta comunicación tiene por objeto delimitar el ámbito de los trascendentales. Primero, presentando los que son, según este orden: esse, verum, bonum, pulchrum. Segundo, señalando los que no son: ahquid, res, causam, sustantia, natura, essentia. Por último, aclarando algunas dificultades respecto a: ens, unum, relatio.

This paper argues that the science of logic follows the theory of knowledge. The objects are ens rationis. It admits that we have two kind of logic: formal logic, which follows via rationis, named abstractio formalis; and real logic, which follows via rationis, named abstractio totius. In consequence, there are divers habits of logic, which permit the use of our different acts of understanding, which pertain to both uses of ratio. Each one of these different logics has different principles: the (...) rational principle, the axioms of logic; the formal principle; the principle of generalisation. (shrink)

en este artículo se distingue entre estas realidades humanas irreductibles: naturaleza, esencia y acto de ser. La primera es la vida recibida de nuestros padres. La segunda consiste en el desarrollo que cada persona humana imprime a esa dotación natural. La tercera es cada quien, cada persona humana novedosa y distinta.

En el s. XVII se mantienen dos versiones rivales sobre el intelecto agente que tuvieron su inicio en el s. XIII: el tomismo y el escotismo. En este trabajo se estudia un representante español de cada una de ellas. Francisco Palanco (tomista) y Francisco Alonso Malpartida (escotista). Ambos sostienen la existencia del intelecto agente en el hombre y su papel abstractivo, y ambos niegan que en esta vida podamos conocer de modo natural al margen de la abstracción. Pero el primero (...) defiende la distinción real entre ambos intelectos, mientras que el segundo sólo admite una distinción formal. (shrink)

The "intellectus agens" is the zenith of the theory of the human knowledge according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is personal in each human being: one with the being of the human person. Separated from the body, without mixture with it, impassible and always in act. Innate cognoscitive light. It proceeds from God, and from Him it participates natural and supernaturally. Through the "intellectus agens" we are free and responsible. It permits to know everything, because it activates the different human (...) cognoscitive faculties. It uses the innate habits as instruments. It is perpetual, but after this life it will no know as now. (shrink)

This note presents the central points of Polo’s recent book, Nietzsche como pensador de dualidades: the reason of the present influence of the philosophy of the philosopher of Röcken; Polo’s critique of the hermeneutics of suspicion ; and Polo’s revision of the nuclear dualities of Nietzschean philosophy. It also explains the Polian prosecution of his theory of knowledge and his ontology contents in this book.

In this paper it is studied the habit of wisdom according to Leonardo Polo; intellectual habit that is innate, superior to the others, solidary to the personal intellect, to whom attains as to known at the level of the act of human being, and to the others personal transcendentals.

In this work we study the suggestive position of some authors who constitute an exception in the history of the philosophy in respect to the interpretation of the agent intellect, the great Aristotle´s discovery: Francisco Canals, Leonardo Polo and his disciples, because these authors put the agent intellect at the level of “ actus essendi hominis ”.

In this paper we study the interpretation of Iacobi Zabarellae on the agent intellect. He argues that the agent intellect different from the potential intelect, to whom activates and lights it directly without mediation; He sais also that do not abstracts in us, that in it coincides his being with his operation, and that is God. It is, therefore, an Averroism combined with Platonic, Augustinians and Thomists elements.

In this paper we study the agent intellect in the XIV century. This work is divided into 3 different parts: Averroism. Nominalism, eclecticism and reductionism. Potencialism.

En este trabajo se estudia la concepción del intelecto agente del filósofo Alfonso, arzobispo de Toledo.Este pensador critica tres sistemas filosóficos: a) El averroísmo, posición de quienes identifican elintelecto agente con Dios. b) El potencialismo, opinión de quienes piensan que es una «potencia» del alma.c) El nominalismo, parecer de quienes consideran que no hay una distinción real, sino sólo de razón, entreel intelecto agente y el posible. Este autor defiende el habitualismo, hipótesis que identifica el intelectoagente con un hábito innato, (...) en concreto, el de los primeros principios.In this paper we study the conception about the agent intellect of Alfonso, Bishop of Toledo. This thinkercriticizes three systems of philosophy: a) The averroism, hypothesis which sustains the identificationbetween the agent intellect with God. b) The potentialism, opinion of those who think that the agent intellect is a potency. c) The nominalism, position of those who defend that there is no real difference between the agent and the possible intellect. This author defends the habitualism, thesis that identifies the agent intellect with an innate habit, concretely, with the habit of first principles. (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia el intelecto agente según Vincentio Quintiano Brixiense (s. XVI). Su descripción es netamente tomista, pues sostiene que existe en el alma, que es una potencia factiva, que está separado de órgano, impasible, ente en acto y realmente distinto del posible. Sus operaciones son abstraer, causar el conocer de los primeros principios y activar al posible, respecto del cual es previo y superior. Ambos son inmortales y eternos, y tras esta vida no conocerán como ahora.

En este artículo, luego de una breve sinopsis de la historia del concepto de participación, se analizan las ventajas e inconvenientes de la teoría de la participación para, finalente, estudiar lo que, siguiendo a Tomás de Aquino, se puede llamar participación predicamental y trascendental. Conforme a esta distinción ambas participaciones serían reales, pero la predicamental sólo se aplicaría a realidades físicas, mientras que la trascendental se atribuiría a los trascendentales metafísicos (ser, verdad, bien, belleza...). Se concluye de este análisis que (...) la noción de "participación", que tradicionalmente se emplea de modo general en las diversas disciplinas filosóficas, es pertinente que sea sustituida en cada rama del saber filosófico por otra más adecuada. Así, en filosofía de la naturaleza parece más conveniente hablar de "causar"; en metafísica, de "crear"; y en antropología, de "coexistir". (shrink)

En este trabajo se defiende que se puede conocer la verdad y el error merced a los hábitos cognoscitivos, porque éstos conocen los actos de pensar que conocen objetos pensados que se corresponden con lo real. Trata también de la verdad y del error. Asimismo de la adquisición, jerarquía, perfección y tipos de hábitos. Indica que todos los hábitos adquiridos de la razón se conocen mediante un hábito innato, la sindéresis. Alude también a los hábitos innatos superiores a éste, en (...) especial, a la sabiduría. (shrink)

The author, after reviewing Aquinas work and the Teachings of the Catholic Church about the cognitive statute of the virtue of Faith, argues, based on Polo's proposals on Anthropology, that is the "personal knowledge", that is, the knowledge at the level of the act of being, and not simply the "rational knowledge" what is elevated by the supernatural virtue of Faith, that God infuses in the "personal kernel" of the human being.

Anthropology differs from ethics according to a hierarchy: a) its topic: anthropology deals with the human act of being, the essence and the human nature, whereas ethics subjects are limited to some dimensions of the human essence , which join the real goods by means of the human action; b) their methods: anthropology's noetical levels are higher and wider than the noetical methods of ethics.

The axiom is an undoubtedly, absolutely evident truth. Everything that is a real act is axiomatizable. Polo has proposed as susceptible of axiomatization the following disciplines: Psychology, Theory of knowledge and will, Ethics, Metaphysics, Anthropology and the axioms of the credibility.

In this paper we study the relation between innate habits according to Polo’s philosophy. We focus on two relations: a) the relation between the innate habit of first principles and the synderesis; b) the relation between the habit of wisdom and the habit of first principles.